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The brain image plays a central role in contemporary image culture and, in turn,
(co)constructs contemporary forms of subjectivity. The central aim of this paper is to
probe the unmistakably potent interpellative power of brain images by delving into the
power of imaging and the power of the image itself. This is not without relevance for the
neurosciences, inasmuch as these do not take place in a vacuum; hence the importance
of inquiring into the status of the image within scientific culture and science itself. I will
mount a critical philosophical investigation of the brain qua image, focusing on the issue
of mapping the mental onto the brain and how, in turn, the brain image plays a pivotal
role in processes of subjectivation. Hereto, I draw upon Science & Technology Studies,
juxtaposed with culture and ideology critique and theories of image culture. The first
section sets out from Althusser’s concept of interpellation, linking ideology to subjectivity.
Doing so allows to spell out the central question of the paper: what could serve as the
basis for a critical approach, or, where can a locus of resistance be found? In the second
section, drawing predominantly on Baudrillard, I delve into the dimension of virtuality as
this is opened up by brain image culture. This leads to the question of whether the digital
brain must be opposed to old analog psychology: is it the psyche which resists? This
issue is taken up in the third section which, ultimately, concludes that the psychological
is not the requisite locus of resistance. The fourth section proceeds to delineate how the
brain image is constructed from what I call the data-gaze (the claim that brain data are
always already visual). In the final section, I discuss how an engagement with theories
of iconology affords a critical understanding of the interpellative force of the brain image,
which culminates in the somewhat unexpected claim that the sought after resistance lies
in the very status of the image itself.
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INTRODUCTION
The brain plays a central role in contemporary image culture: it
has become an ubiquitous and undeniably influential icon, with
its color variations reminiscent of AndyWarhol’sMarilynMonroe
prints (De Vos, 2013b). Perhaps the most significant aspect of
this is the now prevalent notion that, as the sociologists Nikolas
Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached put it, the technologies of visual-
ization finally and objectively reveal the physical basis of human
mental life within patterns of activity in the living brain (Rose
and Abi-Rached, 2013)1. That is, the connection of the psycho-
logical to the brain would ostensibly appear to pass through the
image. For some, this visual link is to be understood quite liter-
ally: science writer Rita Carter contends in Mapping The Mind,
for example, that the brain of a person driven by obsession is
“frenzied” while a “depressed brain” shows a dull glow (Carter
and Frith, 1998).
The primary aim of this paper is to probe the powerful inter-
pellative allure of these brain images, as they are colored by
1Of course, as Rose and Abi-Rached write, most neuroscientists are careful to
speak of neural correlates of mental processes, but “[t]heir press releases and
media accounts are less cautious” (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013).
psychology. The eagerness of the press in this visual-centric time
and age, where the image (especially the digital image) is a priv-
ileged commodity, is one thing, but the other more pertinent
question is, what is the status of the image within wider culture,
and more specifically, within scientific culture and science itself?
For even though brain imaging is not the sole method within
brain science, it most certainly takes a central place -just con-
sider the exponential rise of fMRI studies since 1990 up until
now (Logothetis, 2008; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). Hence, if
the philosopher and cognitive scientist Fodor (1999) is right to
argue against oversimplifying localization research and to ques-
tion why we are spending so much time and money on it, then
to truly understand this requires delving deeper into the power of
imaging and into the power of the image itself.
Having said this, the paper thus represents a critical philosoph-
ical scrutinizing of brain imaging, of the brain qua image, focusing
principally on the issue of mapping the mental onto the brain
image and explicating how, from there, the brain image func-
tions within contemporary culture and why it has come to play
a pivotal role in processes of subjectivation. Hereto, I will draw
upon Science and Technology Studies juxtaposed with culture
and ideology critique and different theories of image culture.
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The first section relates the omnipresent brain image to subjec-
tivity and ideology setting out from Louis Althusser’s concept of
interpellation and his conceptualization of subjectivity. This will
allow me to tease out the central critical philosophical question of
this paper: what could serve as the basis for a critical approach, or
phrased otherwise, where can a locus of resistance be found?2 In
the second section, drawing predominantly on Jean Baudrillard, I
will focus more closely on the dimension of virtuality, specifically
as this is opened up by what I call brain image culture. This leads
to the question of whether the digital brain can be opposed to
old analog psychology: is it the psyche which resists? This will be
taken up in the third section where, however, it will be concluded
that the psychological cannot be the locus of resistance sought for.
The fourth section, then, explores how the brain is constructed as
an icon, and more specifically, from which gaze this emanates. In
the fifth and final section, an engagement with theories of iconol-
ogy will afford a critical understanding of the interpellative force
of the brain image, and will allow me to claim, somewhat unex-
pectedly perhaps, that the requisite resistance lies in the status of
the image itself.
THE BRAIN IMAGE AS AN INTERPELLATION OF
SUBJECTIVITY
The omnipresence of the brain image in contemporary culture
cannot but have effects on how we see ourselves and society
(Hacking, 1998; Slaby, 2010). Indeed, the anthropologist Joseph
Dumit argues that the brains we encounter in magazines and
newspapers, on television, in a doctor’s office, or in a scientific
journal “make claims on us.” Louis Althusser’s perniciousness
concept of hailing might be useful here: one could say we are
interpellated by the brain images. We are called upon to answer
them, to subjectivize ourselves in relation to them. This is the
Althusserian “surplus in the recognition”: interpellation, as an
ideological operation, produces a subject. In the case of the brain
image, then, its message, look this is what you are, can be said to
engender a subject: oh, really, is this me? Or as Dumit puts it:
As people with, obviously, one or another kind of brain, we are
placed among the categories that the set of images offers. To
which category do I belong? What brain type do I have? Or more
nervously: Am I normal? (Dumit, 2004).
One can already discern here a question so obvious that it risks
being overlooked: can the neurosciences account for the sur-
pluses it invokes qua subjectivity? That is, if the brain sciences,
and, more particular yet, those involved in brain imaging, are
engaged in both researching subjectivity and producing subjec-
tivity, then how to account for the multifarious short-circuits and
circularities that this entails?
Of course, one could immediately object that neuroscience
does not necessarily deal with subjectivity per se; rather, its juris-
diction could be said to be limited to investigating the general
principles of the neural system. And by way of a second objection,
one could also say that not all neuroscience research results in or
2The specific notions of critique and resistance will be explained in that
section.
aims at the production of brain imaging. However, would it not
be fair to argue that even the most basic of neurological research
cannot but, in one respect or another, impinge upon the dimen-
sions of subjectivity and the psychological? Indeed, when all is
said and done, the locus or terminus of neural tissue is the brain,
and the latter is, arguably, the very organ of subjectivity, regardless
of how the latter is conceptualized. Secondly, does basic neurolog-
ical research not also invariably produce scientific data, which is
then subsequently used in brain imaging technologies and its log-
arithms? At a bare minimum, a sober questioning of the function
of the image within the brain sciences and the indisputable weight
it carries within the field of neuropsychology might be of some
value to those branches not directly involved with the psy-factor
or with imaging as such.
Ultimately, if the brain image has a saliency within contempo-
rary culture, then it is clear that it will also have surplus effects in
scientific culture and in science as such. In this respect, Beaulieu
(2002) notes that the argument that pretty pictures above all serve
popularizations does not account for the ways in which these rep-
resentations also pervade research environments. The latter can
hardly be understood as taking place in a vacuum; or as Cohn
(2008) has put it, research environments are not a non-space.
Many authors, in this respect, have pinpointed how politi-
cal, economic and cultural factors shape even the most basic
neurological research (Slaby, 2010). Even at the level of primary
neurological research, then, there are ideological surpluses to be
discerned: neuroscientific research is prima facie colored by pol-
itics, economics and culture, which, in turn, colors -if one will
permit this use of imagery- the resulting brain image which is
produced. Is it not precisely these surpluses which subsequently
hail the lay person and engender the Althusserian “surplus in
the recognition?” We are not merely interpellated by science in
other words, but also by the ideological and cultural germs these
sciences, and the images they produce, host.
However, the important question then becomes whether the
interpellative process on the behalf of the brain image can be
fully apprehended within a strictly Althusserian framework of
imaginary misrecognition? Although the ubiquitous brain imagery
does undeniably present us with a glaring, unified and Gestalt-
like image to identify with, one can no longer frame this,
à la Althusser, as offering the illusory promise of being an
autonomous subject. In fact, is not the message the brain images
convey, rather, the exact opposite: look, you are nothing but this
automaton? Patricia Churchland, for example, in spite of the fact
that she rejects the “neurojunk” of “free choice/self is an illusion,”
argues that making decisions, going to sleep, getting angry, being
fearful. . . are just functions of the physical brain (Churchland,
2013b)3 . At the least, then, the interpellation of brain science
seems far removed from an Althusserian conception of it as ren-
dering people unfree by endowing them with an illusionary sense
of freedom, agency and causality. Rather, brain science and its
images actually deconstruct these categories and, most impor-
tantly, deconstruct the subject itself: you are not even unified, but,
rather, as it were sliced up by the brain image and dispersed in
the neural network. Let me be clear, the issue is not to disparage
3See also the Dutch best-seller by brain researcher Swaab (2011).
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this aforementioned deconstruction, nor to attempt to resurrect
some kind of unified or agential extra-neural subject; rather, I am
concerned with understanding the unexpected intricacies of the
interpellation of brain images.
The key issue lies in discerning how the message carried by the
brain image, “look, this is what you actually are,” once it has per-
meated popular culture, not only invites us to identify with the
icon, but also invites us to adopt the iconography. That is, our
self-understanding and self-consciousness is solicited by both the
images and the signifiers stemming from discourses on the brain.
It is important to grasp that what one is actually being called
upon to identify with here is not the brain image as such, the
paradoxical Gestalt signaling the end of unity and agency, but,
rather, the perspective of neuroscience itself. We are, as it were,
being hailed into the position of the neuroscientist observing the
brain. Or, phrased otherwise, where there are images it is crucial
to discern the operation of the gaze, and the point from where
the latter departs. Hence, if brain imagery does indeed bring into
being a subject, this is very specifically an academic subject: inas-
much as brain images and neurological signifiers structure our
self-understanding from the academic vantage point we are called
upon to adopt.
On the one hand, this remains consistent with an Althusserian
conception of the subject as effect and function of a discourse and
of a (power) relation. But, on the other hand, it differs signifi-
cantly from the Althusserian subject who is called upon to identify
with its designated place: for rather than effecting an identifica-
tion with the image itself, the brain image actually calls upon us
to identify with the point from where the image is constructed.
This can be connected to older forms of psychologisation (I
will discuss the issue of psychology and psychologisation in great
detail in this paper): just as the dissemination of psychology
throughout society transformed each of us into our own psy-
chologist (De Vos, 2012), now we are called upon to become the
neuroscientist of ourselves. Today, the omnipresent brain imagery
not only directs the gaze inwards, but, more importantly, imposes
upon us the neuroscientific vantage point from whence to launch
that gaze. This allows me to formulate an altogether different cri-
tique from the well-known Foucaultian strands that argue that
(popular) neuroscience discourses encourage particular kinds of
selves who are then more or less amenable to certain political
agendas (see e.g., Rose, 2006; Johnson, 2008). By way of contrast,
I argue that via the process of interpellation, the subject shifts
position from the neuro(psychological) object he or she is said
to be, toward the external observatory position: fascinated by the
brain scans it exclaims, look, this is what I am! This is how we
can begin to fully apprehend Althusser’s “surplus in recognition,”
as that aspect which assumes the neutral and sovereign position
of Academia. And it is precisely here, in that ostensibly neutral
and naturalizing scientific gaze, that one could claim that ideol-
ogy comes into play: that is, it is in the alleged neutral, objective,
and natural portrayal of mankind—here I follow Slavoj ŽiŽek4—
that one finds ideology at its purest. Our identification with the
4“The stepping out of (what we experience as) ideology is the very form of
our enslavement to it” (Žižek, 1994).
ostensibly neutral and a-political vantage point of Academia is the
paradigmatic form of ideological interpellation today.
But we should not stop here, for is this position not a virtual
position by virtue of the fact that it places us in a transcendental,
non-existent vantage point? One encounters here a remarkable
peculiarity overlooked by neuroscience and perhaps also in its
critiques: it is only a small step from materiality to virtuality.
Unquestionably, despite its claim to be the materialist approach
par excellence, the neurosciences increasingly find themselves,
albeit for the most part unknowingly, in the virtual dimension.
Consider the notion that the mind is but the software of the brain
and might 1 day be uploaded to a computer5. Although these fan-
tasies have often been contested, at the very least they demonstrate
how the neuroscientific approach most readily solicits the virtual.
A number of critics have also touched upon this theme, such as
the anthropologist Allan Young who argues that we have entered
the era of “Human Nature 2.0.” (Young, 2011), or Jan Slaby who
noted that the concept of mirror neurons has come to function
“as a neural Wi-Fi that links us up to form various social net-
works” (Slaby, 2013a). However, to the best of my knowledge, no
extensive study has yet been carried out exploring why virtuality
and the neurosciences so readily invoke each other.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the European Union
launched a huge research program entitled “The Human Brain
project, HBP” the aim of which was to design a super com-
puter which could provide us with an in silico brain. The goal
of the project is to build a new information computing tech-
nology infrastructure capable of integrating all the available data
on the brain, in order to arrive at “detailed computer recon-
structed models and simulations of the brain”6 . As said in a
recent promotional video:
Through this new in silico neuroscience, there will be nothing we
cannot measure, no aspect of the model we cannot manipulate,
there will be no question we cannot ask7.
However, the true problem of this unabashed ambition to “gain
fundamental insights into what is means to be human” (Walker,
2012) might not be that it would lead to in silico knowledge los-
ing sight of the real, concrete, and embodied human being. The
real issue, rather, might be that it fails to understand that it deals
with an always already virtualized subject. Just consider how, by
virtue of the interpellative procedures described above, contem-
porary subjectivity is always already necessarily marked by the
scientific imagery, and entails a subject that shifted position to
the virtual academic vantage point from where it contemplates its
avatar, that is, the neuropsychological object it is said to be. In a
similar, and not altogether unrelated, way, a neuroscience in the
grip of the image and virtuality might fail to grasp that today’s
subjectivity always already passes through image culture and vir-
tuality, as these increasingly define our life-world and personhood
5See e.g., Kurzweil (2005), for a discussion see Chalmers (2010), and for a
critique Nicolelis (2013).
6As stated on: https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/nl_BE/discover/the-project/
research-areas
7https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/nl_BE/discover/the-project/research-
areas; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_UFOSHZ22q4
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(just think of social media, apps and other rapidly evolving ICT-
applications). The project, then, runs the risk of getting lost in the
mirages of the virtual, as it mistakenly supposes that it is modeling
a pure fleshy, material subject.
Hence, a further aim of this paper is to disentangle some of
the short-circuits and circularities in today’s neuroscientific image
culture. If, as a consequence of these circularities, brain imaging
is, indeed, at risk from getting lost in virtuality—as exemplified in
the unquestioned assumptions of “The HBP”—the crucial ques-
tion appears to be how one can resist the compelling interpellative
force of such brain images, seemingly all the more powerful in
their digitality and virtuality? But, as will become clearer, this is
not the right question after all, for if subjectivity is in fact some-
thing which cannot be cut loose from the reigning and hegemonic
icons and iconographies of its times, then it would be a mistake
to look for a subject beyond the image. In such a scenario, and in
line with the philosophical tradition of Immanuel Kant that com-
bines subjectivity with critique (sapere aude positions the modern
subject as a critical subject), the question of what might form the
basis of a viable critique of the hegemony of neuroscientific virtu-
alized image culture, becomes an altogether different one. If, for
Kant, the modern human being was to use his/her own reason (as
opposed to complying with tradition and power), the fundamen-
tal issue became a kind of reflective critique: that is, the discerning
of the conditions and boundaries of thinking itself (Kant, 2005).
In relation to brain imaging, then, the central question becomes:
what are the conditions and boundaries of imaging itself? Or, said
differently, what resists it? Hence, resistance here is not in the
first instance conceived as opposition to the alleged determin-
istic or reductive implications of the technological gaze8 - e.g.,
the negative psychological effects of neuroimaging- but, rather,
as that which delimits (neuro)imaging from within. This resis-
tance, the paper will argue, and somewhat unexpectedly perhaps,
derives from the image itself. It is only from there, I will subse-
quently claim, that the actual deterministic or reductive potentials
of the technological gaze (and their ideological) bearings can be
discerned and eventually criticized.
But, in the interim, there is considerable preliminary work
to be done: the first task is to inquire further into the close
connection between brain image culture and virtuality, which
will involve drawing extensively on the French theorist Jean
Baudrillard.
“THE SPECTACLE OF THE BRAIN” AND VIRTUALITY
All that fascinates us is the spectacle of the brain and its workings.
What we are wanting here is to see our thoughts unfolding before
us - and this itself is a superstition (Baudrillard, 1988).
We want to see ourselves, we are fascinated by the made visible
brain, that thing that does all that psychological stuff of think-
ing, wanting and desiring. Perhaps this is why we denounce the
idea of rational agency, free will and love altogether. Because
when we observe ourselves, via the image of the brain, we take
8For an assessment of these kinds of resistance against neuroimaging see, for
example, Whiteley (2012).
a position outside or beyond cognition, will and desire, and from
this place the latter appear as nothing other than mere chimeras.
The Althusserian surplus in recognition is, as such, that precise
point beyond our own psychology: the spectacle of the brain
engenders the spectator, a paradoxical and emptied out agency
outside of itself.
However, as my earlier reference to psychologisation expressly
indicated, this particular organization of the gaze was already
in place within old-fashioned, pre-neuroscientific psychology.
Indeed, the latter, from its very infancy in the scientific age,
attempted to establish itself as a technology for the visualization of
the human—just consider the one-way mirror, the Gesell Dome
or, for that matter, the use of hidden cameras. These technologies
amount to the construction of an external gaze from where one is
allegedly able to see the true face of human beings. Even the use
of statistics in the psy-sciences can be understood in terms of the
same visual register: the numeric data in the end contributes to
the visualization of human behavior within charts and graphics.
It is from within the dominance of this visual register that the so-
called lay person is addressed: look, this is what you are. Hence,
through what can be called processes of psychologisation—which
form an inextricable part of psychology itself (De Vos, 2012)—
modern man is interpellated to adopt the external gaze and look
upon the homo psychologicus he or she is said to be. Such a proce-
dure is repeated through the neuroscientific interpellation: you
are presented with an image of your alleged final ground and
this redoubles you in, on the one hand, your brain avatar and,
on the other hand, a more obscure and not always acknowl-
edged position (an additional you) from where you contemplate
yourself.
Of course, one can take a step back further still frommodernity
and the advent of the sciences and argue, with Jacques Derrida,
that the human being dwelling in Logos is always already “tele”
from itself (Derrida et al., 2002): this concerns the fact that as a
speaking being the human being is separated (epistemologically
and ontologically) from itself. Or as Jacques-Alain Miller puts it,
the mere fact that one speaks always already transforms “what is”
into a fiction (Miller, 2002). It is at this precise point, that where
Logos allows the human to make an abstraction of what he or
she experiences, that the importance of images comes into play.
Language allows the envisioning of the world, of others and one-
self. In Logos there is always the gaze and the other scene, and it
is in this sense, moreover, that human existence, as a cultural, dis-
cursive, and social issue, arguably has always encroached in one
way or another into the domain of virtuality. Suffice to think of
the historical (religious or other) constructions of an imaginary
space or time, entailing either a pre-world, a beyond-world or a
parallel world (e.g., the Greek mythology, the Christian concept
of paradise, the colonial image of the Americas).
However—to amend this diachronic meta-perspective with a
synchronic one—in modernity this scheme can be said to receive
a very specific turn of the screw. With Immanuel Kant denounc-
ing access to “das Ding an sich” as foreclosed, the image was
bound to take up a more central role than ever before. Modern
science, and with it modern man, thus renounced all claims to
have unmediated access to reality or being. It is here that the reign
of the image truly begins. For, as the Flemish philosopher Marc
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De Kesel argues, in modernity the image loses its pre-modern
grounding and its connection with reality: it is no longer real
or natural, and hence, newly unbound, starts to proliferate in an
unseen way (De Kesel, 2007). The seemingly unstoppable mul-
tiplication of images has to ward off the lack of a firm ground
in ontology. It becomes clear that modern image culture does
not operate as a form of mediation between us and the real, but,
rather, engages in a frenzied process of constituting a virtual space
and reality on top of the gaping ontological abyss. It is in this
respect that De Kesel argues, given that modernity signaled the
end of any claims to a direct connection to being, we have hence-
forth become addicted to images: “we only exist insofar if we
succeed in imaging ourselves” (De Kesel, 2007).
It is at this specific point that the paradox of brain imaging
comes in: brain images are believed to show us how real, natural
and organic we are, how we are all made of flesh and blood.
However, it can also be argued, given their status as digital and
virtual constructs, rather than mediating between us and our
material self, they actually draw us into virtuality. To put it in
Baudrillard’s terms, they concern the real more than the real.
Baudrillard uses this phrase to describe the obsession with the
real so integral to the mythology of our ultra-mediatized society.
It is this voracious demand for reality, truth and objectivity that
he sees at work in live reporting, the newsflash, the high-impact
photo, the eye-witness report, etc. It is the “truer than true”
which counts, or “the fact of being there without being there”
(Baudrillard, 1998). Cyberspace, and more generally, virtuality,
I claim, is the ultimate locus of this real more than the real. To
illustrate this, let me use an anecdote: I met someone at a social
occasion, and after having spoken about what each of us did
for a living, she subsequently asked how my name is spelled so
that she could google me online. To use Sherry Turkle’s quip:
instead of taking me at face value she wanted to take me at my
“interface value” (Turkle, 1995). In other words, today, the real
more than the real resides in the digital sphere, within cyberspace.
For example, as we are all now well aware after Edward Snowden’s
revelations, knowing what people or organizations really think
or are up to requires that you skim and hack digital networks.
This real more than the real, as the very definition of the virtual,
is also a central element of neuroscientific imagery. The crux
of the neuroscientific findings as they are crystallized in the
brain image is that, as Baudrillard puts it, “I was not there”:
the brain imagery essentially poses the paradox of “being there
without being there.” The brain has its own reality, a reality
which we ourselves have no part in, where we are not present.
This is especially tangible in Robert Nozick’s well-known thought
experiment, in which he asks whether we would be willing to
plug our brain into a supercomputer that would provide us
with any experience we desire (Nozick, 1974). Intended as an
argument against philosophical hedonism, Nozick’s experiment
above all shows how the brain, precisely by pushing to virtuality,
cannot but pose the question of “being there” in all its paradoxes.
The brain confronts us with a truth and a reality from which we,
potentially at least, are ourselves absent.
Now, if this issue is more often than not acknowledged by
neuroscience itself, the question nevertheless still remains: is the
recourse to the brain sciences wholly adequate for our attempts to
assess this paradox? For Patricia Churchland, for example, seem-
ingly it is. With little or no fuss she observes that one’s love for
one’s child is simply a matter of neural chemistry, although, she
does acknowledge, “[c]oming to terms with the neural basis of
who we are can be very unnerving” (Churchland, 2013a). How
should we understand Churchland’s seemingly casual use of the
notion of “unnerving?” Is she inferring that even the deconstruc-
tion of our self can be accounted for in neural terms? Or does
it imply a more unsettling conclusion: the brain un-nerves us,
that in the end it de-brains us. Even if one could dismiss this as
mere metaphorical hair-splitting or an exercise in pedantry, the
question nevertheless remains: can the absence of agency, or of
subjectivity as such, and the resultant uncanniness this provokes
within a “subject” really be accounted for by the neurosciences
themselves, or must we take recourse to the old psychological
models in order to elucidate the “psychological” effects of brain
imaging?
Am I not stumbling upon here the horizon of brain imag-
ing, or the point of resistance I was searching for? That is, it is
the psychological, so it would seem, that might be the critical
component of the brain sciences and its production of images.
In order to consider this possibility, and, ultimately reject it, in
the next section I will more substantively question the recent
shift from psychological models to neurological models, a shift
which seemingly runs parallel with the shift from analog image
culture to digital and virtual culture. I will explore this through
recourse to Jean-François Fogel and Bruno Patino’s claim that
digitalization does have its frontier, in addition to drawing upon
relevant art history theories pertaining to the image and the
photograph.
FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PORTRAIT TO THE
DISEMBODIED BRAIN IMAGE
It is tempting to propose that the psychological will never dis-
solve without remainder within the neurological. Consider, for
example, the argument that brain imaging techniques only envi-
sion coarse psychological traits and that, as such, the ephemeral
reminiscing that passes through the mind like a soft breeze, the
subtle gesture or the intricate glance exchanged between two peo-
ple, will forever elude visualization and digitalization. However, if
there is one thing that the rapidly evolving digital imaging tech-
nologies have showed us, it is that what is considered to be analog
and non-scanable today will be fully computable and chartable
tomorrow. Take as a case in point the development of automatic
emotion recognition systems which analyze faces (still photos
or moving faces captured by a camera) in order to determine
emotional states9. Consequently, it would be foolhardy to argue
against the notion that even a single goose bump will eventually
have its correlate in the chemical or electrical status of the ner-
vous system, and thus be, as a result of the continually evolving
technology, fully measurable and digitazible. However, the French
9See for example the website “Visual recognition,” a spin-off of the ISLA lab-
oratory of the University of Amsterdam: http://www.visual-recognition.nl/.
Although, of course, this could very easily be criticized on the basis of it being
an overly artificial assessment of emotions, in which they are divided into a
limited array of fixed categories.
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authors Fogel and Patino proclaim that digitalization does have its
frontier:
Any innovation will eventually be exceeded, the only sustain-
able element is the connection. A login added with a password
to access a network: this is the lightweight baggage that every-
one is guaranteed to carry tomorrow (Fogel and Patino, 2013, my
translation).
Is this the ultimate frontier of digitalization: login and pass-
word, the outstripping and mark of subjectivity proper, good-old
analog psychology as both condition and exception of the dig-
ital and the virtual? Login and password, inasmuch as they
allude to a certain intimacy or a secret even, can be said to
pertain to old-fashioned psychology; that is, to the psychologi-
cal agalma. Although, of course, passwords were always already
not exactly exempt from digitalization, inasmuch as the com-
puter did know them after all. But this could still be consid-
ered within a psychological framework: your password was only
known by the Big Other (to use the Lacanian term), albeit a tech-
nological Other. However, it would appear that the days of the
psychological, semi or pseudo-analog password are truly num-
bered, as today more and more electronic devices are activated
with biometric keys, e.g., scanning your iris or your finger-
print. Biometric access seems not only more secure but also
more idiosyncratic than the analog-psychological password. The
ultimate step here will be for the digital to connect, not to
the potentially digitizable flesh, but, rather, to the digital of
the human body. That is, the ultimate biometric access would
appear to be our genetic code: please lick here! Or, alterna-
tively, the digital network directly connected to the digital of the
human10.
At the very least, the conclusion to be drawn here is that your
unicity is not psychological, which is to say also that it is not
this which resists virtualization and visualization, and, for that
matter, neurologization. The digital brain image is thus the look-
ing glass through which psychological categories (such as free
will, love, empathy, etc.), become neuroscientific issues. The psy-
chological is in this way gradually emptied, becoming, on the
contrary, bio-neurological and, in turn, (potentially) fully scan-
able and digitizable, if not wholly digital as such. Hence, as it
becomes indisputable that thinking, willing, desiring, or even
Marcel Proust’s madeleine-experience for that matter, all depend
on things going on somewhere in the brain, then it would appear
to make little sense to hold on to a psychology which is rapidly
melting away.
It would seem, ultimately, that we have to agree with the
presumptuous ambitions of the HBP: when modeled, the brain
becomes fully malleable and answers to any question. With digital
brain imaging, then, we have made ourselves visible, and hence,
seemingly, fully accessible. In psychological imagery the human
subject had its dark side, the spoken pointed to the unspoken,
the thought to an un-thought, consciousness to an unconscious-
ness. The digital brain image, in contrast, allows potentially full
10See Eugene Thacker’s claim that biology is always already digital (Thacker,
2004).
access: just move the cursor, zoom in or zoom out, set the angle,
adjust the parameters, change the colors. . . The Harvard Medical
School, for example, offers a free online MRI atlas which simulta-
neously shows horizontal, sagittal, and coronal sections through
which one can navigate, whilst displaying any level of the hemi-
spheres, brainstem, and even some spinal cord, all the while using
different MRI weighting (T1 or T2) and PET too11. In prin-
ciple, then, there is no blind spot, no inaccessible area; at the
most there is a sub-consciousness which, in turn, can be made
visible.
In this way, the brain image is not a psychological portrait.
Portraits have traditionally been viewed as revealing some insight
about the figure represented in the portrait (Ayers, 2011) and
opening up some interior space (Pearl, 2010). For Drew Ayers,
photographs, while depicting embodiment, potentially uncover
the truth of things, so that they—and it is here that he leans on
Roland Barthes and André Bazin- expose “the inner workings
of an object or person” (Ayers, 2011). Similarly, Shawn Michelle
Smith contends that the portrait was believed to be able “to depict
the inner soul of an individual in a representation of external
countenance” (Smith, 1999). Hence, the portrait, belonging as it
does to the realm of the imaginary, not only points to the real of
the body, but also functions as, to use Ayers’ terms, “both [the]
index and icon” (Ayers, 2011) of the inner person depicted within
the image. Simply put, the truth-value of the portrait concerned
the psychological: the soul.
This is not at all the case with brain imaging: it does not begin
with the depiction of a supposed embodiment, which then serves
as the index of the terra incognita of the psyche as the supposed
core of the human. Rather, brain scans show and lay bare, more
or less accurately and probably more andmore conclusively in the
near future, (the very base of) the psyche, or at least that which
has previously been referred to by that designation. Sigmund
Freud’s “andere Schauplatz” has thus been tracked down and lost
its independent status. Or, as Churchland has it: “I am who I am
because my brain is what it is” (Churchland, 2013b). In this way
the brain image is not a portrait, a representation that points to
something else; rather, it is a pure self-reflective image, a pure
index or icon of the Real itself.
In the end, then, it is not only psychology that is evacuated,
but also the body. Ayers sees this at work in the so-called DNA
portrait (whereby commercial services offer “personal DNA pic-
tures” based on the analysis of a sample of your DNA) in which,
he argues, the body as surface is lost (Ayers, 2011). Precisely
the same form of dis-embodiment, I contend, is at work in
the brain image as it proliferates in wider culture. After all, is
the paradigmatic brain image within the everyday public sphere
not that of the singled-out brain, presented to us as faceless,
sexless, classless, raceless, and, ultimately, bodiless? Just con-
sider Daniel Amen’s online SPECT gallery,12 which depicts a
panoply of more or less colorful schematized brains. Or con-
sider how governmental and other campaigns connected with
brain research, whether in terms of their academic or non-
academic communication most often use logos figuring isolated
11http://www.med.harvard.edu/AANLIB/cases/caseNA/pb9.htm
12http://www.amenclinics.com/the-science/spect-gallery
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brains13. But perhaps the most salient example of these segre-
gated brains is the increasingly popular images of the connectome:
as most of them lack the contours of even the skull or of the
brain cortex itself,14 they seem the ultimate trope of the bodiless
stand-alone brain. Even in (f)MRI brain scans, in the particu-
larly rare instances in which we see a nose, lips and especially
eyes, does it not all too quickly become uncanny if not utterly
obscene? At the least, and contra Casini (2011), one could argue
that brain images are not portraits as they do not look back—the
latter property, according to Nancy (2006), being characteristic of
late modern portrait photography.
The paradox is that when shown one’s own photograph, one
often finds it difficult to identify with, whereas the digital brain
image appears far less problematic to relate with, as it is supposed
to represent you at your most natural. As BBC-journalist Evan
Davis puts it after having an MRI scan of his brain:
I’m just fascinated by the pictures (. . . ) That’s my brain? That’s my
head. . . . That’s quite a good picture isn’t, you could recognize it as
me (my transcription).15
But, precisely because you had no access to your psychological-
analog core, your psychology, in turn, had an intuitive weight and
presence that you could claim. Access to your bio-neurological
unicity, contrastingly, is wholly possible and relatively unprob-
lematic as it is mediated by the digital brain image, but it reveals
to us that any intuitive subjective weight and presence are merely
illusory, or better yet, virtual. Or in the words of the artist Susan
Aldworth, “You can look INTO my brain but you will never find
me”: the brain image signals a non-presence or perhaps even the
weightlessness of the psychological: “I am both in my head, and
out of my brain” (Aldworth, 2011). Even if Aldworth, at first
glance, appears to look for a Self beyond the brain scan, she can
eventually be said to situate this surplus outside the psychological
realm: while undergoing a cerebral angiogram (for medical rea-
sons) she relates how she herself watched the produced images on
a computer screen:
Looking up at the screens, I could see the inside of my brain with
my eyes - my brain was working, while I was looking inside it. I
will never make sense of that moment (Janes, 2000).
This testifies to the fact that the compelling interpellative power
of the brain image concerns not so much the injunction to iden-
tify with the brain as such, but, as noted prior, to identify with
the academic gaze. Is the conclusion, then, not that there is still in
fact an “andere Schauplatz” after all? If this is indeed the case, then
this warrants a closer scrutiny of the structure and the dynamics
of the gaze, starting out from that sovereign place and then delin-
eating the ways in which the brain is subsequently constructed
as a particular powerful and central icon within contemporary
culture.
13e.g., the BRAIN initiative (Brain Research through Advancing Innovative
Neurotechnologies) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uJuxLDRsSQc.
14http://www.humanconnectomeproject.org/gallery/
15http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid8241000/8241440.stm
THE ICONOGRAPHIC BRAIN AND THE DATA-GAZE
But, firstly, if I refer to the brain as iconographic, then what
exactly is an icon? As Susan Buck-Morss explains, the icon should
be understood in its Christian-Platonic lineage: that is, it is pre-
cisely at that point where the relation between ideal forms and
earthly forms presents us with the enigma of their connection,
that the icon comes in. Buck-Morss’ central example is that of
sovereignty: “The sovereign is an icon in the theological sense.
He (or she) embodies an enigma—precisely the power of the col-
lective to constitute itself” (Buck-Morss, 2007). This enigma can
be comprehended as follows: constituted power cannot but be its
own ground, it has to be its own constituting power. Or, to put
this in terms of the law, the law, as it founds a community, nec-
essarily has to be called into life (and sustained within its life)
from a position before (and beyond) the law. The closing of this
circle, Buck-Morss contends, demands a miracle: “and the icon
of the sovereign figure provides it” (Buck-Morss, 2007). The icon
thus can be said to effect a short-circuit; an impossible but effec-
tive closure of sovereignty and the law whereby they paradoxically
constitute the very ground on which they are standing upon.
Is not the same issue at stake in relation to subjectivity? For
must the subject not also assume its own subjectivity, whilst lack-
ing the very grounds on which to do so? Especially since the
advent of modernity, from that moment when God was no longer
able to provide indisputably the final ontological guarantees, the
subject must be both the constituted and the constituting subject.
Hence, the subject too requires an iconic relay between its ideal
and earthly form. This function today, I suggest, is no longer ful-
filled by the abstract icon of the Soul, but by the concrete brain
image. Observing its dominance within contemporary popular
culture, it is evident that the brain has become today’s predom-
inant icon, serving as the impossible bridge that traverses the
ontological abyss on which the human being founds itself. The
brain imagemakes visible, embodies and fleshes out the essence of
the human being, thus short-circuiting the enigma of subjectivity.
But, of course, if the specificity of the icon is such that it performs
its function by transposing an impossibility into the register of
the image and the visible, the question then becomes which gaze
in particular is mobilized?
Within the Christian-Platonic iconography it is the transcen-
dent gaze of the figure of God that is at play. Recall Walter
Benjamin’s argument that in Homer’s time the human was above
all an object for the gaze of the Olympic Gods (Benjamin, 2008).
Similarly, in this respect, ŽiŽek refers to the gigantic Aztecan
figures of animals and humans that could only be seen from
a view-point far up in in the sky (Žižek, 2002). The gaze that
an icon mobilizes thus goes back to the gaze of a transcendent
instance. Buck-Morss, in this regard, demonstrates that the roots
of today’s modern “empire of the gaze” (as she refers to the
“global media industry”) can be traced back within the history
of Christianit16 . By way of an aside, perhaps this goes some
way to explaining why a number of authors have discerned a reli-
gious component to neuroscientific imaging. Slaby, for example,
16Buck-Morss argues that while, on the one hand, Christianity took over
much of Roman iconography, on the other hand, once the Roman Empire was
Christianized, the connection allowed a transcendent claim for sovereignty
(Buck-Morss, 2007).
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points to the ritualistic and quasi-religious connotations of the
fMRI-procedure, in which the operators take on the role of priest-
esque figures (Slaby, 2013b). In this respect, it is clear that the
central ambiguity of Christian iconography, that is, of a non-
material God becoming flesh, does indeed return in cerebral
iconography: after all, the brain image does show us both a mate-
rial and a non-material, virtualized human subject. The only
difference today, is that we have substituted the omniscient eye of
God with that of Science. As argued, the brain image very specif-
ically interpellates us into adopting an academic point of view
from which to look back upon ourselves, others and the world
itself. Since modernity, then, the human is both the subject and
object of and for the sciences and their Archimedean Gaze.
But, of course, immediately one then raises the question,
how does science, and more specifically brain science, construct
this gaze? In this regard, Amit Prasad perspicaciously argues
that, although the new medical imaging techniques share some
similarities with “nondigital visuality,” they do not involve “see-
ing” in the traditional sense: MRI, for example, is not based
on the reflection or absorption of light or other electromag-
netic waves (Prasad, 2005). Rather, the newer imaging techniques
rely on measurements and computations. Hence, as Beaulieu
points out, neuroscientists concerned with basic, non-clinical
research (e.g., functional imaging) often rail against the reduc-
tion of neuroimaging to its pictorial component. They claim to
do quantitative and experimental work, as opposed to visual and
observational work. Concerning the images they produce, they
argue: “They’re not pictures, they’re statistical maps” (Beaulieu,
2002).
The common answer to the question concerning why one goes
from measurements and data to pictures is that visualizations
are used because of the complexity of the quantitative data. As
Beaulieu writes: neuroscientists argue that in the end vision is the
sensory modality with the broadest bandwidth (Beaulieu, 2002).
Following from this, one could go onto argue that, by making
the computer’s datasets accessible to the human being through
the medium of the image, the contingencies come in. But are we
really starting off with non-visual data? Is the visual, therefore,
only a necessary detour in light of the fallibility of human under-
standing and its preference for the pictorial? If that would be the
case, then one might seek to avoid the image as much as possible;
would not, for example, in the future, a full computerized diag-
nosis of a tumor no longer require the detour to the visual realm
and the clinician’s gaze?
However, a closer examination of the rationale of the differ-
ent brain imaging technologies might suggest that the primordial
data are always already affected by the visual register. Just consider
how the basic premise of imaging technology is the consideration
of the brain as a three-dimensional, spatial object. Measuring,
then, is a matter of, as Beaulieu describes this in relation to
PET technology, establishing a relation between the space of the
brain inside the scanner and the space of the digital image. That
said, Beaulieu contends that, notwithstanding the reluctance or
ambiguousness vis-à-vis the visual, much of the empirics of brain
imaging is achieved by using pictorial conventions to render space
(Beaulieu, 2002). Taking this argument one step further, I’d argue
that, given that this data is de facto spatial, then they are also
always already embedded in the visual register. It is therefore
not a question of a secondary translation of non-visual or non-
pictorial data. Rather, as Beaulieu drawing on Andreasen et al.
(1992) already noted, in brain imaging technology the observer
is technically incorporated into the machine (Beaulieu, 2002). In
other words, the measurements are made, the data is gathered by
teleporting, as it were, the gaze of the observer into the scanner.
Hence, as it has already been argued that for the computer to
generate the data, a substantial amount of editing has to be car-
ried out (see for example Ortega and Vidal, 2007; Slaby, 2013b), it
is my contention that this editing starts precisely from the incor-
poration of a subjective perspective within the technology. That
is, the scanner’s vantage point, I claim, is akin to the way a human
eye would peer into a sliced up body part. Consider also how, as
Prasad remarks, the noise and the inconclusive data have to be fil-
tered out with the help of the so-called reference or body atlases
comprising ideal or normal types of human cerebral anatomy
(Prasad, 2005). This, in my opinion, shows that the production
of data is anthropomorphized, as it were. The especially versatile
gaze of the scanner, going from axial, to sagittal to coronal (with
further differential viewing based on the differences in relaxation
times of hydrogen atoms after magnetization, or in terms of pro-
ton density), is in the end constructed as if a human subject were
the carrier (or in the appropriate Latin term, the subjectum) of the
gaze. In short: the data-gaze of the computer is modeled upon the
model and the abstraction of the (super)human gaze.
It is precisely this, of course, that complicates the process of
interpellation I described earlier, in which the brain image evokes
a subjective surplus within the process of recognition. At the least,
it is notable that the idea that, as brain images become popular-
ized, the folk psychological gaze of the layman easily goes astray
and needs guidance from the expert (who has the appropriate way
of seeing the image as condensed and rendered data) is deeply
flawed in two respects. Firstly, because the alleged pristine data is
always already visual inasmuch as they are the result of the sci-
entific gaze; and secondly, because one risks skipping over the
fact that it is precisely with this gaze that the modern subject
identifies him or herself via the process of interpellation. That is,
the alleged spontaneous, folk psychological gaze of the layperson
(easily derided by the senses and seduced by the image) is but a
mere fiction. If the layperson is in fact fooled by images, then it is
precisely in his position as a proto-academic subject.
To this scheme, just onemore twist is needed which is provided
by Prasad’s argument that the new medical imaging techniques
represent a “cyborg visuality” (Prasad, 2005). In other words, it is
precisely through the intricate connection of data with the visual
in brain imaging that the virtual comes in. Consider Prasad’s
point, reached through recourse to the work of Anne Balsamo,
that in imaging technologies the human body seems to have lost
its materiality and instead becomes a visual medium (Prasad,
2005). It might be appropriate to suggest that, by virtue of the
technological data-gaze the human turns into an immaterial
dataset and becomes its own avatar. Hence, in contradistinction to
one of the neuroscientists cited by Beaulieu, who in his rejection
of the visual contends: “So once the field grows up [and] becomes
less interested in mapping, it will be numbers” (Beaulieu, 2002),
my argument is, rather, it will be virtual.
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However, within this complex assemblage one crucial issue
remains: what is the status, then, of the brain qua image? Does
it still have a meaning of its own, and if not (as it is merely one
of the points within the schema of the gaze), how are we then to
understand its interpellative force? These questions concern the
iconology of the brain.
TOWARD AN ICONOLOGY OF THE BRAIN IMAGE
Iconology, following the seminal understanding of Erwin
Panofsky (1972), differs from iconography: while iconography is
descriptive, the linking of artistic motifs with themes, concepts or
conventional meaning, iconology concerns the interpretation of
the images’ meanings. That is, as Panofsky writes, iconology “is
apprehended by ascertaining those underlying principles which
reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious
or philosophical persuasion—qualified by one personality and
condensed into one work” (Panofsky, 1972). For Panofsky, this
level of “intrinsic meaning” was to be understood as somehow
beyond the conscious volition of the individual artist. However,
formy attempts here to construct an iconology of the brain image,
William J.T. Mitchell’s recalibration of Panofsky’s ideas is crucial.
Mitchell can be said to have substituted the issue of the basic atti-
tudes of a nation, period, etc., with the question of what the image
itself wants (see Mitchell, 2005). That is, for Mitchell, iconology
does not concern the interpretation of the images’ meanings, but
the interpretation of the images’ desires. The seminal question is
thus:“what do pictures want?” (Mitchell, 2005). Arguing against
the dominant perspectives that approach visual culture interpre-
tively and rhetorically, Mitchell wanted to assess what pictures
mean and do, and account for the transfixing power they pos-
sess on their own terms. For Mitchell, images are not merely inert
objects conveying meaning, but, rather, they are like living organ-
isms, things that have desires, needs, appetites, demands, and
drives all of their own.
From here, the question can be asked: what does the brain
and/or the brain image want? Or, put differently, what is the lack
which fuels its desire? Hence, if, as aforementioned, the brain, as
an index of the real, lacks both a body and a psyche, then it can
be argued that it is from here that the brain image receives its
interpellative power. The brain is presented to us as a simulacrum,
which, in Baudrillard’s conceptualization of the term, is neither
a symbol nor a reproduction of something else: it is, rather, the
ersatz of something that was always missing, something which is
(necessarily) lacking. Therefore, it is precisely as the semblance of
an ultimate Real that the brain image is capable of capturing our
fixation and transfixing us17.
But, in the interest of clarity, it is important to stress that the
brain is a simulacrum precisely because it is the ersatz of the
absent psyche. For, it can be argued that the modern psyche rep-
resents nothing but a signal of the human being having lost any
of its ontological ground since the advent of modernity. In fact,
the emergence of modern psychology during the Enlightenment
corresponded with an epochal problematization of subjectivity
17Or, as Baudrillard observes: Any system that is totally complicit in its own
absorption such that signs no longer make sense, will exercise a remarkable
power of fascination (Baudrillard, 1990).
itself. In one respect, the subject was at risk of being engulfed
by the massive objectifying potential of the sciences, while in
another respect, it was only science that could offer it the neces-
sary reference or anchoring points hitherto provided by God and
religious discourse18. The psyche, ultimately, stands for the very
ontological abyss laid bare by modernity.
One way in which this notion of the brain image as the
transfixing simulacrum of psychology can be apprehended, is
via Adorno’s, McLuhan’s and Baudrilllard’s conception of late-
modern media as being characterized by a predominance of form
over content (Taylor, 2008). We appear to be fascinated by the
form, the sulci, the gyri, the deeper structures, etc., and are not
so concerned by the fact that this form can only be filled with the
rather meager (non)content of psychology (which reduces us to
individuals with a limited if not standardized behavioral, cogni-
tive, and emotional life). If the neurosciences can be said to be
reductionist, then this is because the reduction has already been
done at a prior stage. Psychology is always already, and indeed
inevitably, in the business of trading content for forms (empty
forms barely concealing the structural absence of content), which
are ideally suitable for subsequent mapping onto the brain. Even
if this mapping of psychology to the brain is done in a sophisti-
cated fashion (trading neo-phrenology with a dynamic network
approach and/or attributing plasticity to brain-processes, for
example) the neurosciences nevertheless always remain suscepti-
ble to regressing back within a correlationist-reductionist scheme.
The issue of the brain requiring filling in by psychology res-
onates strongly with the fact that, via the same virtual and
image technologies used in brain imaging, our life, relationships,
and work increasingly take place on virtual platforms such as
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram: our presence on these social media
sites is also fleshed out with psychology. We like or no longer
like, we have friends and networks, we have a life-line, we have
events. In other words, social media technology prompts us to
act like decent subjects: in fact, we are literally stuffed to the
brim with psychology. Do you like this? Why do you not like
this? Do you want to share it, put it on your lifeline? Remember,
it’s your mother’s birthday in a few days. . .Our virtual double
cannot remain empty, it has to be fleshed out in psychological
terms, our virtual avatar needs to be dressed, very specifically, in
psychological robes.
This filling up of the empty virtual space with psychology,
not surprisingly, is precisely at hand in the rationale of the
aforementioned HBP:
Neuroscience and medicine both require an integrated multi-level
understanding of brain function in the context of cognition and
behavior. The HBP ICT platforms would provide a new founda-
tion for this kind of research. Once brain models have been inte-
grated with a simulated body acting in a simulated environment
and trained to display a particular competency, neuroscientists
would be able to systematically dissect the neuronal mechanisms
responsible, making systematic manipulations and measurements
that would be impossible in the lab (Walker, 2012).
18This Catch 22 situation can be reformulated as follows: both the modern
psyche and modern psychology are Enlightenment’s stillborn children (De
Vos, 2013a).
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Hence, returning to the desire of the brain image, do we not find
ourselves in precisely the same situation as the story Pinocchio?
That is, the imaged and virtual brain desires to become human,
it wants to be fleshed out with psychology. Neuroscience needs
psychology, mainstream cognition, and behavior psychology, to
construct the architecture of its scene and to position its avatars
within this scene.
But, of course, the significant aspect of all this is that the
HBP is not that far removed from everyday life: indeed, if
the program intends to study simulated bodies in simulated
environments, is this not what everyday life is actually like in
contemporary societies? After all, are not the “variables” under
research “perception and action, decision-making, goal oriented
behavior, navigation, multisensory perception, object recogni-
tion, body perception. . . ” (Walker, 2012) not precisely the same
variables that structure our actual lives? That is, whether in edu-
cation, parenting, schooling, work, etc., it is these items that
we are continually told matter, these items that both structure
what is done (and what we ourselves do) and form the basis
on which we are evaluated. Again, everybody here is hailed into
adopting the external point of view: the toddler knows what
empathy is and why it is important, the parent knows the the-
oretical background of positive reinforcement, and the manager
instructs his workers into the brain-based psychology of being
goal-oriented.
So, again, the question arises: should we concentrate our
critical efforts upon finding ways to protect the human from
these forms of (neuro)psychologisation, visualization, and vir-
tualization? To stand firm and assert that the human (or the
revolution) will not be fMRI-zed? However, the conclusion of
this paper is that what should concern us, in actual fact, is
not so much the possible mismatch between the human (as he
or she would allegedly really be) and the virtual, but, rather,
the potential gap between the imagined, analog-psychological
human, and the virtual, digital-neuronal human. For, as I’ve
hopefully made clear, any attempt to defend a supposedly real
or true human would inevitably only lead to recourse to another
version of psychology or meta-metapsychology, which, in turn,
would unwittingly lead to yet another virtualization. To look for
a subject beyond the image and the psychologized imagery is thus
a dead-end.
Resultantly, it is perhaps expedient to follow Mitchell’s sug-
gestion that there is something in the image itself which resists
digitalization (Mitchell and Smith, 2008). Mitchell argues, on the
basis of a series of paintings including René Magritte’s famous
“Ceci n’est pas une pipe”-painting (picturing a pipe together with
the caption “this is not a pipe”), that the picture “offers a pres-
ence and insists on an absence in the same gesture” (Mitchell
and Smith, 2008). Is this not precisely what the brain scan
does also? It appears to offer a massive, ontological and fully
fleshed out human being, whilst simultaneously serving as the
personification of the notion that there is nobody at home in
the brain as such: in fact, if anything, the multi-colored charts
signal that the ghost in the brain has fled. But Mitchell also
adds that, beyond this dynamic of presence and absence, images
also testify to an excess, an additional density or plenitude, a
kind of “surplus” of presence (Mitchell and Smith, 2008). In
the brain image this surplus manifests itself in a very specific
sense: the brain knows, feels and experiences more than we
think (or know, feel, and experience). Subconsciously, allegedly,
archaic emotions are in play, computations are done and cog-
nition is mobilized all without us having the faintest clue of
what is happening (see e.g., Ledoux, 1996; Libet, 1999). And it
is here where the ghost in the brain seems to reappear, albeit as
a sort of homunculus inhabiting our skull. The psychology allo-
cated to the brain in the end cannot be ours, it is the brain’s.
In this way, one could say that the function of today’s neuropsy-
discourses is above all to contain and to tame this extra brain-man
gone wild, this psychological Übermensch living inside our head.
Mitchell himself perspicaciously tries to see in the “pictorial
turn” in the twenty-first century a “biopictorial turn,” point-
ing to “the production of copies, simulations, or reproductions
of living organisms and organs, and along with this, a resur-
gence of ancient fears about “doubles,” evil twins, and the loss
of identity” (Mitchell and Smith, 2008). Concerning these “bio-
cybernetics,” Mitchell contends that the enigma and the defiance
for our understanding is that, while, on the one hand, image
culture is today fully digitalized, on the other hand, there is
something of the dimension of the analog sticking in the image
itself:
[O]n the one hand, we live in the ‘digital age’, and, on the other,
[. . . ] images – analog signs, mind you – have now taken on a new
and unprecedented power.Wewill not be able to keep our bearings
in the new visual and mediatized worlds that are opening before
us unless we grasp firmly at both horns of this dilemma (Mitchell
and Smith, 2008).
Indeed, even if imaging today has become fully digital—and
hence only now the unbound reproductive potential of the
image (and hence its indestructibility) is fully unleashed—the
image remains, at its functional, phenomenological level, ana-
log. This is why a picture, given that its digital format in the
end does not coincide with the image itself (the Gestalt-like
form)19, is not “googleable” as such. To illustrate this fact: I
once found a (rather iconic) image on a website, albeit with-
out the proper citation information: subsequently, I wanted to
reuse the image in a paper and thus required a reference regard-
ing the source of the image. However, to my annoyance, I have
to admit, I found myself faced with the impossibility of googling
it directly, so I had to take recourse to discursive descriptions
of the image. However, in the interim Google has developed
“Google Image Search,” which allows you to search for other
images by uploading or dragging an image into the search box
itself. This clearly represents an attempt to try to get a grip
on the analog character of the image, as the search is based
on captions, meta-tags, data found on the webpage where the
image is located, and to a certain extent image recognition (using
e.g., color patterns). Experimenting with some self-made and
on the spot generated images (which obviously have no dis-
cursive tags or connections whatsoever), does generate some
19Also Mitchell stresses the need to distinguish between the image and the
picture (Mitchell, 2005).
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results which show vaguely similar images (color patterns do
seem to be the main criterion), however, ultimately, this testi-
fies to the tenacity and the resistance of the analogness of the
image.
It would appear, then, that we have to conclude that Logos
(destined to go virtual and digital) does in fact have its remain-
der, its excess, and that this is precisely the image qua analog
image. The brain image is, ultimately, not digital, but analog.
As aforementioned, in order to shift from brain data to brain
images the human gaze must be brought in: the human factor,
in other words, is the image. The movie The Matrix illustrates
this point nicely: in certain scenes the virtual life-world of the
avatars becomes visible in its true form, that is, as green data
(the so-called “digital rain”), scrolling down over the screen20.
The central idea of the movie is that in order for the digital
to come alive, that is, to become image, the human factor is
required. Again, the human factor is the image, which, on the
one hand, makes digitalization and virtualization possible, whilst,
on the other hand, resisting full digitalization by introducing
the analog into the virtual. If in pre-modern times image cul-
ture was tributary to the Christianization of Roman iconography
(see Buck-Morss, 2007), today the two central forces that define
our present-day virtual image culture are science and the corpo-
rate media. Any viable resistance and critique will have to start
from the fact that, in this digital day and age, the medieval dic-
tum “The primordial rose abides only in its name; we hold names
stripped” no longer holds, today it is the stripped images that we
hold on to.
Let me make reference to an artistic attempt to do so: the
Flemish artist Jan Fabre’s work “Madonna.” In a remarkable
version of what for Buck-Morss is the icon par excellence, the
Madonna with child (Theotokos, the point between divinity and
humanity), Fabre’s pieta portrays the artist himself as the fig-
ure of the dead Christ. While Fabre depicts Maria’s face as
a skull—the skull of early modernity, reminiscent of the pre-
modernmementomori and themodern drawings of Vesalius—the
artist, as the son of god, depicts what we could understand
as the late-modern equivalent of the skull, that is, the brain.
However, remarkably, the brain is not positioned inside his
head, but, instead, is almost casually held in the right hand
of the son-figure. Such a gesture fully elevates the brain into
the position of an icon, in the sense that it is not coexten-
sive with the subject itself, but, rather, its excess. At the most,
one could say it is the point of liaison between the subject
and the Human as such. The brain appears precariously close
to dropping out of the hand of the figure of the artist, and
falling onto the ground. This could point to the vulnerability
of the human, e.g., the vulnerable brain, but it could also be
drawing attention to the fact that the brain, having become an
icon, is inevitably always on the verge of slipping out of one’s
hand. Each and every icon, it could be said, begs for iconoclasm
whilst simultaneously resisting it, by virtue of it being analog.
Therefore, perhaps, in the whole installation in Vienna, themajes-
tic pieta is surrounded by four giant (if not obscene) cerebellums,
each of which is adorned with a religious attribute or artistic
20Of course this is still image based language.
(auto) reference. One might be forgiven here for interpreting the
multiplication of thesemassive, heavy, analog brains in a Freudian
way: the proliferation of the brains signals the absence of the
psyche.
CONCLUSION
If today we increasingly live in a visual culture whereby the pri-
mary way in which we relate to ourselves and the world is via
the image, then it is fair to say that this image is constructed and
validated by the techno-scientific discourses. In this paper I have
tried to trace the pathways of this complex scheme. Firstly, I have
argued, by virtue of drawing upon but eventually transcending
an Althusserian interpellative framework, that the (late)modern
construction of subjectivity is invariably centered around the
adoption of an academic point of view. This is an important
point, I claim, if one wants to understand how neuroscience
is in danger of being unknowingly drafted into contemporary
bio-politics: the identification with the alleged a-political van-
tage point of Academia is the precise form of contemporary
ideological interpellation.
Secondly, I have demonstrated that brain imaging cannot be
cut loose from the far-reaching digitalization and virtualization
of our life-world. To summarize my conclusions on this point in
an admittedly bold statement: if left unquestioned, this close link
threatens to invalidate the whole project of brain imaging.
Thirdly, I have considered and, ultimately, rejected the
possibility that psychology, given that it presumably would
resist the force of neuro-colonization, could provide the basis
on which to understand the conditions and boundaries of
neuro-imaging. As it were, psychology, rather than being
the solution or a locus of resistance, is actually the unac-
knowledged and structurally unsolvable problem of the brain
sciences.
Fourthly, I have closely examined the ways in which the icono-
graphic brain is constituted via what I have called the data-gaze.
I have posited that, at the site of the production of academic
knowledge—i.e., at the site of the object and how this is con-
structed by science—the latter inevitably harks back to the subject
and its intricate and paradoxical auto-construction (the sub-
ject as both constituted and constituting). Brain data is hence
always already visual data, as they derive from an encoding of
the subjective gaze within the activity of data collection itself.
And, moreover, it is in relation to this paradoxical objectify-
ing/subjective gaze that the so-called lay-man identifies him or
herself.
Fifthly, I have argued, through recourse to Mitchell’s recon-
ceptualization of iconology, that the fundamental question to
ask is: what does the brain image want from us? This is where
a deconstruction, or rather a decentering of psychology can be
effected: what the brain image lacks is a body and a psyche,
and it’s only from this vantage-point that its powerful interpella-
tive force becomes clear. This is because it is precisely there that
the neurosciences get caught within processes of psychologisa-
tion and virtualization, and, in turn, risk regressing back within
a correlationist-reductionist scheme. At that point, I concluded
that, given both the hegemony of the neuroscientific virtualized
image culture and the fact that attempts to look for a subject
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beyond the image has proved to be a dead-end, the only viable
basis for a critical approach is to be found in the analog-ness of
the image itself.
By way of reiterating this albeit somewhat paradoxical con-
clusion, and in an attempt to show its bearings, I would argue
that we owe the instantiation of the Academic vantage point, a
vantage point that this paper has demonstrated is central to the
operation of brain image culture, to René Descartes’ epoché, his
contemplative retreat from the world in order to be “more a spec-
tator than an actor in all the comedies that are played out there”
(Descartes, 1996[1637]). Descartes’ positioning of himself in the
theatre seat so to speak constitutes the point of departure for
the modern objectifying gaze, which, in turn, creates the imagery
and the scene that is looked upon. Continuing the dramaturgi-
cal metaphor, it is immediately apparent that the visual culture
we live in needs scenario’s and scripts in order to structure and
organize both what is seen and what happens within the scene.
For Descartes, this was his “provisory moral”: searching for truth
and suspending all certainties, he adopted a provisory code of
morals in order to be able to locate himself in the world. For the
late-modern subject, I would argue, this is the specific function
carried out by the neuropsy-sciences, in the sense that, via the
medium of the brain images, they flesh out the scripts that struc-
ture what we perceive and how we navigate our way through the
scene (De Vos, 2013a). It is only through full acknowledgment
of the fact that any analysis of this scheme will invariably culmi-
nate in the irreducibility of both the gaze and the image (and its
stubborn analog-ness) that any critical position can arise from
where to assess the reductive and bio-political entanglements of
that scheme.
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